Britain didn't give a damn about Poland when the Soviets invaded in 1920, so why did they suddenly care so much in 1939? The answer, of course, is that the British people didn't care. They had no ethno-cultural ties with Judeo-Poland. The (((British))) government, on the other hand, cared a great deal.
In the piece below (building on the two before) I try to answer why the guarantee to Poland was given. It's hard to summarise, but basically it was the least Chamberlain could do to remain Prime Minister. His whole Cabinet had turned against him. Again and again I find that politicians, civil servants and the media drove the anti-German agenda and, over time, convinced some of the public and forced it on the rest. As you say, none of this came from the people originally.
The annexation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 was a huge blow to Chamberlain because he had obtained personal guarantee from Hitler at the Munich conference in September 1938. England had not only signed a bad agreement but Hitler had voided it in less than a year's time. I view his remaining Prime Minister in March 1939 as a small miracle.
Yes, Chamberlain seems to have been isolated in the Cabinet by early 1939. Halifax had joined the war camp over the winter and started attending meetings of the Focus. Those who still supported Chamberlain were seen as insufficient. Chamberlain's decisions through 1939 were made under extreme pressure.
Stalin disassembled Comintern when he finally could, there was a clear break between early communists bent on promoting world revolution vs. Stalin’s side focusing on building it in the USSR after repeated failures of revolutions in Hungary, Bavaria and elsewhere. Stalin and Britain had special relationship, there is no doubt about it.
When he finally could? My understanding is that Stalin disbanded the Comintern as a show of goodwill to the US and UK, but only in 1943, and he established much the same thing as the Cominform in 1947, though by then the West was much less an open field for their activities.
Churchill made a bet on the ability of France to fight and lost it badly. But this was not the end of the empire. Churchill brought the loss of the empire by his many war-time strategic errors. The biggest error was diverting the Australian divisions to Greece instead of finishing the conquest of Libya ; decision made against the wishes of Wavel, the overall commander in Cairo. That decision led to 2 years of heavy fighting with enormous losses of men and material. Antagonising Japan, a former ally, was another really bad choice. There were many others. Their cumulative effect was for England to "win" the war, lose the empire, crumble under war debts, lose strategic compass, and decline.
Another destructive decision was supplying the Soviets with masses of materiel, including some of the best and newest weaponry, shortly before the Japanese struck at Singapore. I don't talk about this aspect of the war so much, though, as I'm less informed on it than on the politics.
I believe it is good to follow-up on those questions, because something has been "seen" and current history appears not reliable enough, thank you for your work.
A psychological point of view allows to see several things; what is considered a prime factor for evaluation is "psychopathology" - deviancy and damages for example.
From this vantage point, Stalin's pre-war actions makes him ineligible for ally-ship and all who sided with him became somehow "monsters" by association. This is something that requires the utmost attention because it's even akin to "irrealistic" from a human view point - but people don't think about this, "because it's war, geopolitics". Hitler fall into such category, but surely the Allies too..
From what people noticed, Stalin should have taken the palm of the demonization, but today, only Hitler features it - 100%. In historical teachings, Stalin deserves as much as Hitler, but I find it under-represented - if not at all. This gap is especially relevant in common culture. I suppose that 90% of people would benefit from such understanding. This becomes problematic.
Hitler suddenly changing his way and attacking Stalin may refer to his sudden & late understanding of being a fool, a pawn, and that since the start Stalin was going to side with the Allies. The Allies siding with Stalin the butcher hints at psychopathology being present at the Allies side, and Machiavellian is a feature of psychopaths. Hitler may have gone 360° and tried to go against his puppet masters. He may actually have been the least psychopathic of all, that's to say how bad the others were.
There is a simple fact that is yet under-considered - but something that may be used as a starting ground: Stalin, pre-war, literally butchered his people. This makes a first row of Soviet losses. Then, Hitler oddly finds himself against him, and Russia suffers from heaviest casualties - again. This makes many Russian casualties...
As you suggest, I think Hitler did realise, by the time his forces invaded the Soviet Union, that he was caught between Stalin and the Western Allies and may well have perceived them as working together. In the years before 1939, I think Stalin seriously saw Britain as the main enemy and also sought to foment any and all unrest within or discord between (as he saw it) the capitalist states. However much they could be encouraged to fight each other was all to the communists' advantage.
From the very amateurish historian perspective that is mine, I notice many historical explanations including a too huge room for "opportunism"
I believe that we have glimpses of something different, popping up here and there, then vanishing behind the scene, with opportunism ("strategical dynamism") coming back:
"And then, Hitler, given that... did... and..."
What makes me stop at this is that I notice is that some basic concepts which require being completely discarded - nazism, gulags (we are after it happened) - become morally elastic! The problem is that this is not how we work, how the majority work and this is really bugging.
I suppose this makes people start to question the monolithic specs of WW2
Thank you for your article! Good luck and all the very best!
Britain didn't give a damn about Poland when the Soviets invaded in 1920, so why did they suddenly care so much in 1939? The answer, of course, is that the British people didn't care. They had no ethno-cultural ties with Judeo-Poland. The (((British))) government, on the other hand, cared a great deal.
In the piece below (building on the two before) I try to answer why the guarantee to Poland was given. It's hard to summarise, but basically it was the least Chamberlain could do to remain Prime Minister. His whole Cabinet had turned against him. Again and again I find that politicians, civil servants and the media drove the anti-German agenda and, over time, convinced some of the public and forced it on the rest. As you say, none of this came from the people originally.
https://eternalhorus.substack.com/p/a-conflict-of-philosophies
The annexation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 was a huge blow to Chamberlain because he had obtained personal guarantee from Hitler at the Munich conference in September 1938. England had not only signed a bad agreement but Hitler had voided it in less than a year's time. I view his remaining Prime Minister in March 1939 as a small miracle.
Yes, Chamberlain seems to have been isolated in the Cabinet by early 1939. Halifax had joined the war camp over the winter and started attending meetings of the Focus. Those who still supported Chamberlain were seen as insufficient. Chamberlain's decisions through 1939 were made under extreme pressure.
Stalin disassembled Comintern when he finally could, there was a clear break between early communists bent on promoting world revolution vs. Stalin’s side focusing on building it in the USSR after repeated failures of revolutions in Hungary, Bavaria and elsewhere. Stalin and Britain had special relationship, there is no doubt about it.
When he finally could? My understanding is that Stalin disbanded the Comintern as a show of goodwill to the US and UK, but only in 1943, and he established much the same thing as the Cominform in 1947, though by then the West was much less an open field for their activities.
Churchill made a bet on the ability of France to fight and lost it badly. But this was not the end of the empire. Churchill brought the loss of the empire by his many war-time strategic errors. The biggest error was diverting the Australian divisions to Greece instead of finishing the conquest of Libya ; decision made against the wishes of Wavel, the overall commander in Cairo. That decision led to 2 years of heavy fighting with enormous losses of men and material. Antagonising Japan, a former ally, was another really bad choice. There were many others. Their cumulative effect was for England to "win" the war, lose the empire, crumble under war debts, lose strategic compass, and decline.
Another destructive decision was supplying the Soviets with masses of materiel, including some of the best and newest weaponry, shortly before the Japanese struck at Singapore. I don't talk about this aspect of the war so much, though, as I'm less informed on it than on the politics.
Churchill was the devil priest
I believe it is good to follow-up on those questions, because something has been "seen" and current history appears not reliable enough, thank you for your work.
A psychological point of view allows to see several things; what is considered a prime factor for evaluation is "psychopathology" - deviancy and damages for example.
From this vantage point, Stalin's pre-war actions makes him ineligible for ally-ship and all who sided with him became somehow "monsters" by association. This is something that requires the utmost attention because it's even akin to "irrealistic" from a human view point - but people don't think about this, "because it's war, geopolitics". Hitler fall into such category, but surely the Allies too..
From what people noticed, Stalin should have taken the palm of the demonization, but today, only Hitler features it - 100%. In historical teachings, Stalin deserves as much as Hitler, but I find it under-represented - if not at all. This gap is especially relevant in common culture. I suppose that 90% of people would benefit from such understanding. This becomes problematic.
Hitler suddenly changing his way and attacking Stalin may refer to his sudden & late understanding of being a fool, a pawn, and that since the start Stalin was going to side with the Allies. The Allies siding with Stalin the butcher hints at psychopathology being present at the Allies side, and Machiavellian is a feature of psychopaths. Hitler may have gone 360° and tried to go against his puppet masters. He may actually have been the least psychopathic of all, that's to say how bad the others were.
There is a simple fact that is yet under-considered - but something that may be used as a starting ground: Stalin, pre-war, literally butchered his people. This makes a first row of Soviet losses. Then, Hitler oddly finds himself against him, and Russia suffers from heaviest casualties - again. This makes many Russian casualties...
As you suggest, I think Hitler did realise, by the time his forces invaded the Soviet Union, that he was caught between Stalin and the Western Allies and may well have perceived them as working together. In the years before 1939, I think Stalin seriously saw Britain as the main enemy and also sought to foment any and all unrest within or discord between (as he saw it) the capitalist states. However much they could be encouraged to fight each other was all to the communists' advantage.
Hello - thanks for your reply.
From the very amateurish historian perspective that is mine, I notice many historical explanations including a too huge room for "opportunism"
I believe that we have glimpses of something different, popping up here and there, then vanishing behind the scene, with opportunism ("strategical dynamism") coming back:
"And then, Hitler, given that... did... and..."
What makes me stop at this is that I notice is that some basic concepts which require being completely discarded - nazism, gulags (we are after it happened) - become morally elastic! The problem is that this is not how we work, how the majority work and this is really bugging.
I suppose this makes people start to question the monolithic specs of WW2
Thank you for your article! Good luck and all the very best!